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Abstract
In the applications of the non-Walrasian macroeconoraic framework to
open economy models balance of trade is usually assumed to be uncon-
strained. This assumption rules out any feedback effect of a foreign
exchange shortage on the rest of the economy. The present paper exa-
mines the role of a foreign exchange constraint in the short-run macro-
economic adjustment of developing countries. A non-Walrasian two-sector
model is developed to show that raacroeconomic response to external and
internal shocks depends on the nature of unemployment in the economy as
well as the situation in its foreign exchange market. The results also
suggest possible explanations for the differential growth performances
of the oil-importing developing countries after the oil crisis in the
early seventies. Finally, we find that the "exports-first" rationing
rule which is usually assumed to exist in the market for exportables is
not appropriate in the presence of a foreign exchange constraint. In
this paper, we suggest a more general rationing rule and examine its
implications. Unlike the "exports-first" assumption, the suggested
rationing rule depends on the situation in the rest of the economy and
can be considered as endogenous in this sense.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINT AND MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
If relative prices are rigid, markets may fail to clear and macro-
economic equilibrium has to come about through quantity adjustments.
Properties of such "non-Walrasian" equilibria to a large extent depend
on the signs of excess demands in those markets which fail to clear.
When the situation in a market changes from one of rationing sellers to
one of rationing buyers, or vice versa, quantity-adjustment mechanisms
and "spill-over" effects may change substantially. The reason is that
often the two sides of a market have different elasticities and differ-
ent relationships with other markets. Differences in the properties
of various configurations of excess demands and excess supplies in
one-sector closed-economy models have been vividly shown by Barro and
Grossman (1971), Malinvaud (1977), and Muellbauer and Portes (1978).
In recent years, the "non-Walrasian" framework which was developed in
the above studies has been applied to one- and two-sector open-economy
models by Dixit (1978), Neary (1980), Cuddington (1980, 1981) and
others. These studies show that when the model economy is made open
to international trade or when it is endowed with more than one sector,
the distinctions among different "non-Walrasian" regimes remain signi-
ficant and, moreover, the impact of policy on the trade balance also
depends on the prevailing situation.
Open-economy fixed-price models have so far focused only on the
interactions among labor and goods markets, implicitly neglecting the
problems an economy might face in its foreign exchange market. It is
usually assumed that the foreign exchange market is always in excess
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supply; in ocher words, the amount of foreign exchange that a country
can borrow is unlimited. As a result, in these models, the feed-back
effect of a possible foreign exchange constraint on the rest of the
economy is generally ignored. This issue is particularly important
in developing countries where inability to prove credit-worthiness
restrains their borrowing possibilities in the international capital
2
markets." Current foreign debt problems of many developing countries
and their consequent severe economic difficulties point to the signi-
ficance of the foreign exchange constraint in some countries and raise
3questions about policy alternatives under these circumstances.
In the present paper we intend to examine the role of a foreign
exchange supply constraint in the short-run macroeconomic performance
of an open economy. We will show that the situation in the foreign
exchange market affects policy multipliers in different non-Walrasian
regimes. The model developed in this paper also differs from the pre-
vious works on non-Walrasian fixed-price open-economy models in another
fundamental respect. In those models, a recurrent assumption concern-
ing the rationing rule in the market for "exportables" is that exports
are the first component of final demand to be rationed in case of an
output shortage. This assumption is usually justified on the basis of
4
transportation and transaction costs. However, if the economy faces
a foreign exchange constraint, this rationing rule may have destabiliz-
ing effects: a reduction in the supply of foreign exchange leads to a
decrease in imports which, in turn, may "spill-over" into the market
for exportables by constraining their supply or by inducing an increase
in their domestic demand. This effect results in further cut in exports
-3-
and further reduction in the supply of foreign exchange. In such a
situation, one expects the government to intervene and to stabilize the
system by preventing exports from being excessively reduced. In this
case, the rationing function in the market for exportables depends on
the severity of the foreign exchange constraint, as well as on other
parameters. The model presented here provides an example of such an
endogenous rationing scheme.
The argument in this paper is based on a two-sector fixed-price
model which is described in Section I. In Section II, two unemployment
regimes—classical and Keynesian—with and without foreign exchange
constraint are specified. Full-employment regimes will not be con-
sidered in this paper in order to concentrate on the more likely situ-
ations and to keep the paper to manageable proportions. The impacts of
domestic price policies and of external shocks in various situations are
analyzed in Sections III and IV. Section V, finally, is the conclusion.
I. The Model
The model developed in this section depicts a developing economy
with two sectors. The first one, sector 1, produces a final good which
is used for consumption, investment, and export. The second one, sec-
tor 2, produces an intermediate good which satisfies part of input
requirements of the first sector. The rest of the intermediate input
requirements of sector 1 are imported. We will assume that these sec-
tors act as two representative profit-maximizing firms. The final good,
X , is produced according to the following production function:
(1) X = f(L ,N).
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where L is the level of employment and N is the amount of the inter-
mediate input. The production function of the intermediate good sector,
g(.), depends only on amount of labor employed in that sector, L
? ,
with
no explicit intermediate input:
(2) X
2
= g(L
2
).
In a sense, the domestic production of the intermediate good, X„ , may
be considered as the net output of the sector. The reason why capital
stocks have been omitted from the lists of factors in both production
functions is that they are assumed to be fixed and immobile in each
sector in the short run.
The two production functions are assumed to have the following pro-
perties:
(3) f
L
> 0, fN
> 0, fLL
< 0, tm < 0, fLN > 0,
£
LL
£
NN " (£LN
)2
>
°'
where the subscripts of f and g refer to partial derivatives of these
functions with respect to labor and the intermediate input. The gross
complementarity assumption between labor and the intermediate input in
sector 1—i.e., f . „ > — is not crucial for our purposes. However,
while the existence of such a complementarity in the long run may be
disputed, it seems to be a reasonable assumption in the short run, which
is the time horizon in our model. Note that since f(.) has only two
variable inputs, labor and the intermediate input always have to be net
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substitutes, unless either f has convexities or it is of Leontief-type
where f . = B.
LN
In this model, the domestic price of the final good will be the
numeraire . It is convenient to choose the currency units such that the
foreign price of the final good is also equal to one. Thus, the exchange
rate for exports becomes unity. The foreign price of the intermediate
good in terms of the final good is p*. This price may be different
from the domestic price of this good, p, due to tariffs, subsidies, or
differential exchange rates for imports. The real wage rate which is
defined as the wage rate in terms of the final good and denoted as w,
is assumed to be the same in both sectors. The three relative prices
in this model
—
p*, p, and w—are exogenous in the short run and vary
only parametrically in the policy experiments. Note that since both
goods in the model are traded, a devaluation will have the same inter-
pretation as a reduction in the real wage rate.
There are essentially five markets in this economy. These are
markets for: the final good, the intermediate good, foreign exchange,
"wealth," and labor. We will deal with these markets one by one in the
rest of this section. Since prices do not equilibrate supply and demand
in these markets, imbalances have to be resolved by rationing of one
side of the market or the other, depending on the sign of excess demand.
We will distinguish effective demand and supply levels by superscripts D
and S, respectively. Actual transactions will be denoted by capital
letters without superscripts. These may represent rationed quantities,
or they may be equal to their corresponding effective demand or supply
levels.
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(1) The Final Good Market: The output of the final good is used
for private consumption, C, public consumption, G, investment, I, and
exports, E. Therefore, for the actual transactions in this market, we
always have:
(4) X=C + G+I + E.
If demand for the final good exceeds its supply, the amount allocated
to any one of these uses may be different from its effective demand
level. On the other hand, if effective aggregate demand falls short
of effective supply, suppliers will face a sales constraint. We will
assume that government expenditure and investment demand, denoted
respectively as G and I
,
are exogenously determined and are never
rationed. Exports on the other hand are subject to rationing. The
country is assumed to be a price taker in the competitive world market.
However, it is reasonable to assume that in the short run the economy
C
has a limited export capacity E . Therefore, for actual export we
C 6 D
will always have E <_ E . Finally, private consumption demand, C , is a
function of the real disposable income, Y:
(5) C° = C(Y), where < c = C < 1.
The condition on the first derivative of C(.) indicates that the final
good is normal and, therefore, the marginal propensity to consume, c,
is less than one. Excess of disposable income over consumption is saved
as "wealth" holding which represents future consumption. Private con-
sumption may also be rationed in the final good market, in which case
households will be "forced" to save. If C is the actual consumption,
private savings are:
7-
(6) S
p
= Y - C,
The real disposable income of the households is defined as:
(7) Y + X
2
- p(N - X
2
) - T,
where T is the amount of direct tax collected by the government. For
algebraic convenience, T is assumed to be exogenous.
(2) The Intermediate Good Market: Imports and production in sec-
tor 2 are the two sources of supply of the intermediate input which is
solely demanded by the final good sector:
(8) M + X
2
= N.
We assume that N is greater than X , so that M always remains positive.
We also assume that sector 2 never faces a sales constraint. Therefore,
in case of excess supply in the intermediate good market, imports should
adjust to balance demand and supply. However, if demand exceeds supply,
input demand in sector 1 has to be rationed. The supply of imports is
determined in the foreign exchange market which is discussed next.
(3) The Foreign Exchange Market: Demand for foreign exchange is
p*M, and its supply consists of export earnings, E, and foreign borrow-
ing, B. Therefore,
(9) E + B = p*M.
S
We assume that supply of foreign loans and reserves is fixed at B . If
demand in the foreign exchange market exceeds supply, then imports have
to be rationed and the foreign exchange constraint is said to be binding.
S
In case of excess supply, the country borrows less than B . that is B
-8-
varies according to Che needs of the country, as long as it is less
than 3' .
If M is eliminated between (8) and (9), then the intermediate good
market and the foreign exchange market can be combined into one single
market
:
(10) E + B = p*(N - X ).
In the rest of this paper the above relationship will represent this
combined market which will be referred to as the foreign exchange market.
(4) The Wealth Market: Equilibrium in the wealth market implies
that total investment should be equal to the sum of private savings, S
,
government savings, S , and foreign savings, B:
G
(11) I = S + S + B.
P G
Using (4), (6), (7), and (10), we can substitute for I, S , and B in
order to come up with the government budget identity:
(12) Sr = T + (p - p*)(N - X ) - GG Z
which states that government savings are equal to tax and tariff revenues
less government expenditure.
(5) The Labor Market: This market consists of a fixed supply of
S
uniform labor, L
,
and two demand components in the two sectors, L and
L . As mentioned above, in this paper we will onlv consider the cases
where supply of labor exceeds its total demand and, thus, part of the
labor force is unemployed. Following the non-Walrasian fixed-price
literature, we will distinguish two types of unemployment—Keynesian
and classical—depending on the situation in the final good market.
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Causes and natures of these two types of unemployment are different and
each situation calls for a different type of policy action. Excess
supply of the final good implies that the constraint on employment ori-
ginates in the deficiency of effective final demand and that the real
wage is not a major consideration in the expressed demand for labor.
This situation is usually called Keynesian unemployment . On the other
hand, if effective final demand is sufficient and producers are not
constrained in their output market, employment will be determined by
the profitability condition where the real wage rate plays an important
role. This is a classical unemployment situation. In this paper, each
one of these unemployment regimes will be studied under two circumstances
in the foreign exchange market—excess supply and excess demand situa-
tions. We will argue that economic problems and policy impacts in each
unemployment regime depend on the foreign exchange situation of the
economy.
The wealth market which balances savings and investment in the eco-
nomy can be considered as residual. This market will be ignored in our
analysis by virtue of Walras ' law. Since the intermediate good and
foreign exchange markets are also combined as one market, only three
markets will be left. Combination of excess supply and excess demand
situations of these three markets results in eight different regimes,
four of which will be examined here. In the next section, we will
characterize the two unemployment regimes in our model and in each case
we will specify two foreign exchange sub-regimes.
-10-
I I . Unemployment Regimes and the Foreign Exchange Constraint
(1) Classical Unemployment : The main characteristic of a classi-
cal unemployment regime is that in this situation sectoral outputs are
determined by profitability conditions. If there is no foreign exchange
constraint, the first-order conditions of profit maximization in the
8
final good sector can be written as:
(13) f
L
(L
1
,
N) - w, and ^(4, N) = p.
These equations determine L.. and N, which can be used in conjunction
with the production function in (1) to find the profit-maximizing level
of output. In the intermediate good sector, output is determined in a
similar manner. The first-order condition is:
(14) pgL (L 2 ) - w.
Solving (14) for L„ and substituting in (2) yields the level of output
in sector 2.
Since in a classical unemployment situation, the demand in the final
good market exceeds supply, at least one component of final demand has
to be rationed. While there are practically infinite number of ways in
which this can be done, we will use a simple rationing rule which may be
considered as an "optimal" rationing policy. This rule assumes that the
government has seme control over exports and acts as a rationing agent
with the objective of maximizing the domestic use of the final good, i.e.,
maximizing X - E. In the absence of a foreign exchange constraint, this
rule means that exports should be the residual component in the final
good market so that all domestic demand is satisfied. That is,
-11-
(15) E- Xl -C
D
- G°- I D £E C .
This is, in fact, the assumption that is usually employed in the fixed-
9
price open economy models. However, the implications of our rationing
rule are quite different when the economy faces a foreign exchange
constraint. In this case, the level of exports becomes important and
treating it as a residual is no longer a viable policy. The reason is
that the export and intermediate input levels are directly linked to
each other through the foreign exchange constraint,
(16) E + B
S
= p*(N - X ).
If excess demand for foreign exchange is not induced by heavy subsidi-
zation of the intermediate input, marginal productivity of imports in
the economy should be greater than p* . In this case, cutting exports
by one unit reduces N by 1/p*, which leads to a reduction in the output
of the final good by more than one unit. This means that if exports
are the residual in the final good market, they will go down more than
one unit and imports will be cut further. Such a process takes the
system more and more away from equilibrium and destabilizes the economy.
Note that as the import shortage exacerbates, the marginal productivity
of the intermediate input increases and, as a result, the above process
accelerates. This process resembles some short-term disastrous develop-
ments in some developing countries, such as the foreign exchange crisis
in Turkey in 1958. However, since such events are rare and short-
lived, we will assume that often governments manage to avoid them and
thus operate closer to the above "optimizing" rule.
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Let us now examine the implications of maximizing the domestic use of
the final good in the presence of a foreign exchange constraint. If we
ignore the demand limitation on E for the time being and let X - E be
maximized with respect to E, the first-order condition can be written as:
d(X - E) dX dN 1 dX dX
(17) dl
= dN"dE " l
= F^T" l = °' henCe: dN- =P **
*
where we have used (16) to determine dN/dE. The second order condition,
which is assumed to hold, is discussed in section (1) of the Appendix.
Condition (17) has a simple interpretation: exports should be set such
that total marginal productivity of the intermediate input in sector 1
is equal to its foreign price. In order to evaluate dX /dN, we should
respecify the first-order conditions of profit maximization in sector
1
—equation (13)—since this sector is now input constrained. We have,
(18) f (L , N) = w, and ^(i^, N) > p.
Differentiating (1) and substituting from (17) and (18) yields,
dX
n
dL,
(19) sr "sr + f N
"
p *-
Equation (19) emphasizes the fact that due to the presence of unemploy-
ment in the economy, total marginal productivity of the intermediate
input is not just its partial effect, f , but it also includes an
N
externality effect due to the change in employment in sector 1. Such
externality effects are to be expected in non-Walrasian models where
factor markets fail to clear. In this case, labor is a factor in
excess supply and, therefore, with a shadow price of zero, while its
marginal productivity is positive.
-13-
Dif f erentiating the equality in (18) , one finds that dL /dN =
-f /f > 0, which shows that the externality term in (19) is positive.
Using this result, (19) may be written as:
dX
l
fLN
(20) vr -
-rf + f N p *-
Note that condition (20) will not hold if its solution implies a switch
to other non-Walrasian regimes or an "optimal" export level exceeding
the exogenous export capacity limit. In particular, if
(21) p > p* + «(f
LN
/f
LL
), then f
N
> p* + «(f
LN
/f
LL
)
due to the inequality in (18). In this case, we always have
d(X - E)/dE > 0, which implies that when there is a tariff on imports,
or sometimes even when import subsidy is small, domestic use of the
final good may be expanded if exports are allowed to increase. Thus
exports will be allowed to expand to their capacity limit. This situ-
ation, i.e., binding export-capacity and foreign-exchange constraints
with classical unemployment, is perhaps more common among developing
countries.
If (20) has a valid solution when solved together with (18), it gives
the "optimal" levels of employment and intermediate input in sector 1,
denoted as L* and N* , respectively. Given these levels, output of the
final good, X* , and the export level, E* , can be found from (1) and
(15). If the export capacity limit is reached before condition (20) can
be fulfilled, then the intermediate input level will be determined by
the foreign exchange constraint and employment and output of sector 1
will be given by (18) and (1), respectively.
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(2) Keynesian Unemployment : Insufficient effective final demand
is the main characteristic of Keynesian employment regimes. Output of
sector 1 in this case becomes a function of the final demand which de-
pends on the real disposable income. Since the real disposable income
is itself a function of sectoral outputs, the system is determined
simultaneously. Writing the right hand side of (4) in terms of the
final demand levels and substituting for Y from (7), we find,
(22) X = C[X - p(N - X ) - T] + E° + G° + 1°,
which determines the sales constraint of sector 1. Note that in this
situation export capacity limit will always be binding. Under the
Keynesian unemployment regime, when the exogenous variables of the
model change, equation (22) sets in a multiplier process which is simi-
lar to that of the simple textbook Keynesian models.
If the foreign exchange constraint is not binding, the intermediate
input and employment levels in this sector will be determined by produc-
tion function (1), given the sales constraint, and by the following cost
minimization condition:
f
T (V N) „
(23)
f
L
(L
1
>
N)
= ~ while f
L
(L
L
, N) > w, and f^1^ , N) > p.
N 1
On the other hand, if the economy faces a foreign exchange constraint,
the intermediate input level is given by:
(24) N = X + (ED + 3 S )/p*
and employment, is found from the production function in (1) using the
sales constraint determined in (22). In this situation, instead of (23)
we should have,
-15-
(25) f
L
/ f
N
< w/p> and f
T
> w
>
and f > p.
In both foreign exchange situations, employment and output in sec-
tor 2 are determined as in the classical unemployment regime by the
profitability condition (14) and the production function (2).
In the following sections, we will examine the comparative statics
of the non-Walrasian equilibria specified here. Changes in exogenous
variables are assumed to be small enough to rule out the possibility of
switching regimes.
III. Domestic Price Policies
In this section, we will analyze the impacts of changes in the real
wage rate and the domestic price of the intermediate good on the economy
in different unemployment-cum-foreign-exchange regimes. Demand manage-
ment policies will not be considered in this paper, since their impacts
in different foreign exchange situations are more or less the same and
similar to the results of other studies in this area.
(1) Classical Unemployment : It is clear from equations (13) and
(14) that in a classical unemployment regime without foreign exchange
constraint, for the determination of outputs and inputs only domestic
relative prices matter. In order to learn about the impacts of changes
in p and w in this situation, we differentiate equations (13) and (14),
and solve the resulting system for the differentials of the inter-
mediate input and the sectoral employments levels:
(26) dL = k(f dw - f dp)
1 NN LN
(27) dN = k (" fLN
dw + f
LL
dp)
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(28) dL
?
= h(-dw + gLdp)
2 -1 -1
where, k = [f f - (t" ) ] > 0, and h = -[pgTT ] ' > 0. Equations
LiL. .n.n LIN LL
(26)-(28) show that a policy of real wage restraint would lead to
greater factor use in both sectors and raise their outputs. A reduc-
tion in p has the same effects on sector 1, but it discourages produc-
tion in sector 2. In order to examine the effects of these policies
on the real disposable income, we differentiate (7) and use the facts
that dX = wdL + pdN and pdX = wdL^ to find:
(29) dY - dX + p(dN - dX ) - (N - X )dp = wdL - (N - X )dp,
where L is the total employment and, thus, dL = dL + dL . The right
hand side of (29) shows that variations in disposable income can be
decomposed into two effects: an employment effect and a transfer effect.
The first effect emphasizes the fact that in a classical unemployment
regime increased labor income due to increased employment is a net gain
to the national income, since labor can produce more at no cost to the
economy. The second effect is a pure transfer effect between households
and the government due to changes in import tariff or subsidy rates. A
real wage restraint policy enhances employment and, therefore, adds to
the real income. On the other hand, the net effect of a reduction in
the price of the intermediate good on income is not clear a priori,
since it enhances production in one sector while decreasing it in the
other one. Note that under this policy, the transfer effect also plays
a role and adds to the real disposable income depending on the volume
of imports.
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In order to examine the effects of price policies on exports and
trade balance, we differentiate (15) and (10) and use (29) to get:
(30) dE = dX - dC = dX - cdY = (l-c)wdL + p(dN - dX
?
) + c(N - X9 )dp,
(31) dB = p*(dN - dX
2
) - dE = -(l-c)wdL + (p* - p)(dN - dX
?
) - c(N - X )dp.
The first term on the right-hand side of (31) shows that the employment
effect in (29), despite its positive impact on consumption, leads to
increased exports and reduced trade deficit. The reason is that house-
holds' marginal propensity to consume is less than one and their
increased savings replace foreign savings. The second term is a "trade-
distortion" effect. To the extent that the domestic price of imports
exceeds their foreign price (or, alternatively, the final good is under-
priced domestically), more imports mean greater national product in
foreign currency terms and lead to an improvement in the trade balance.
Exports always go up when imports increase, since output increases
without adding to the real disposable income in excess of the employment
effect. Finally, the third term on the right-hand side of (31) is the
impact of the transfer effect mentioned above on consumption which
causes a reduction in exports and an increase in the trade gap.
Wage and price policies have ambiguous effects on exports and the
trade balance. A real wage reduction increases employment, but has
unclear effects on imports. A lower price of the intermediate good,
on the other hand, has an ambiguous effect on employment, a positive
effect on imports, and a positive effect on households' disposable
income. Note that the relative responsiveness of the two sectors is
quite important in the determination of the direction of the price
-Im-
policy impacts. If the intermediate-good sector is highly responsive
to the relative price changes, exports might actually fa LI in response
to a real wage cut due to the increase in income and consumption which
it induces. In this case, a reduction in p may also lead to a fall
in exports. However, the impacts of price policies on the trade
balance will still depend on the direction of the "trade-distortion."
As we have seen in Section II, when the foreign exchange constraint
is binding in a classical unemployment regime, the economy can face two
different situations. In one situation, the total "marginal produc-
tivity" of imports is set equal to their foreign price and exports are
held below their capacity limit. In the second situation, the total
"marginal productivity" of imports is greater than their foreign price
and export capacity is fully utilized.
In the first situation, levels of employment and intermediate input
in sector 1 are determined by (18) and (20). An interesting implica-
S
tion of these equations is that L* and N* are independent of B and p.
An increase in foreign exchange borrowing limit leads to an equal reduc-
tion in exports and to an equal increase in the domestic use of the
final good, leaving imports and domestic production levels unchanged.
An increase in p has a similar net effect on sector i through a differ-
ent mechanism: domestic production of the intermediate good goes up
and, since the demand for this good does not change, less foreign ex-
change is needed. Therefore, exports can be reduced. Note that these
are the options of a country which has sufficient export capacity and
access to foreign exchange so that it can subsidize its imports to a
large extent and vary its export level in order to maintain a constant
flow of intermediate inputs for its industries.
-19-
A reduction in the real wage rate, in this case, tends to increase
employment, as the differentiation of (18) would indicate. However,
as we have shown in section (2) of the Appendix since marginal produc-
tivity of labor falls, the externality term in (20) diminishes and
tends to reduce the optimal levels of intermediate input and employment
in sector 1. Moreover, since changes in f „/f depend on the unknown
third order partial derivatives of f(.), this factor also adds to the
ambiguity of the effect of a real wage change (see the Appendix,
equation A. 5)
.
In the more common case where the foreign exchange constraint is
binding and full export capacity is utilized, supply of intermediate
input is determined by:
(32) N = X
2
+ (E
C
+ B
S
)/p*.
Equation (18) then determines the employment level in sector 1 and, as
before, output can be found through the production function (1). In
this situation, a reduction in p has a large negative effect on produc-
tion, for the simple reason that in the face of constrained imports, it
reduces domestic production of the intermediate good and tightens the
input constraint of sector 1. This is in sharp contrast with the
results of a fall in the price of the intermediate good when the eco-
nomy does not face a foreign exchange constraint. Changes in the real
wage rate, on the other hand, have effects similar to those they had in
the absence of the foreign exchange constraint. However, in this case,
the impact of a wage cut is greater since it increases employment in
both sectors and relaxes the intermediate input constraint at the same
time.
-20-
Since, in this situation, exports are exogenous ly given, the im-
pacts of price policies on the domestic use of the final good are the
same as their impacts on X •
(2) Keynesian Unemployment : When sector 1 faces a sales constraint,
the output multiplier process and the net substitutibility between labor
12
and the intermediate input in sector 1 take effect. Differentiation
of (22) summarizes the multiplier effect and shows that the output of
the final good is inversely related to the level of imports:
(33) dX
i
=
-Np-]d(N - X_).
1 1-c 2
If the foreign exchange constraint _is_ binding, imports will be pre-
determined and, thus, output of the final good will not change unless
exogenous components of the aggregate demand or the foreign exchange
situation change. Under this regime, a reduction in p has no direct
effect on sector 1, since the intermediate input of this sector is
rationed. However, this policy reduces the output of sector 2 and,
therefore, the supply of the intermediate input. Sector 1, then, has
to hire more labor in order to produce the same amount of output. It
is interesting to note that total employment has to rise. The reason
is that the intermediate input has high marginal productivity in sector
1 and the reduction in its availability should be compensated by hiring
labor in this sector by more than the amount of labor laid off in sector
2. This result follows from the first inequality in (25) and,
(34) dL = dL + dL = ("f/f + w/p)dN
-L I. Lj .N
where we have used (14), (24), and the differential forms of (1) and
(2). In contrast to the above policy, a reduction in the real wage
-21-
rate raises output and employment in sector 2 and provides more input
for sector 1. Equation (34) then suggests that employment in sector 1
as well as total employment should fall. Note that under a Keynesian
unemployment regime with foreign exchange constraint, domestic price
policies have no effect the real disposable income. The reason is that
since the reduction in output of sector 2 is always exactly equal to
the reduction in the intermediate input of sector 1.
The multiplier effect summarized by (33) becomes more important
when the economy does not face a foreign exchange constraint and the
level of imports can be changed by price policies. A reduction in p,
in this case, will have a negative impact on the economy since it en-
courages substitution of the intermediate input for labor in sector 1
and, at the same time, discourages production in sector 2. Equation
(33) shows that these effects should raise the level of imports and,
therefore, reduce the output of the final good. Note that the
intermediate-input demand N tends to fall when p goes down, but, as we
have shown in the Appendix, this effect cannot reverse the process and
cause the output to end up at a level higher than where it initially
was. The effect of this policy on total employment is not clear since
substitution and effective demand effects on L work in opposite direc-
tions. Finally, a reduction in the real wage rate has quite different
effects in this situation: employment is encouraged in both sectors,
demand for the intermediate input falls, and imports decrease. As a
result, the trade deficit diminishes, disposable income increases, and
production of the final good rises by a multiplier.
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IV. Import Prices, Exports, and Foreign Borrowing
In this section the impacts of external shocks in different situa-
tions are examined. We will assume that domestic relative prices
are not affected by these shocks in the short run. In particular, we
assume that when there is a change in the foreign price of the inter-
mediate good, its domestic price will not be affected. In other words,
the government adjusts the tariff or subsidy rate such that the domestic
relative prices remain the same. Any domestic price change thereafter
is regarded as policy response—the effects of which were examined in
Section III. In this respect, it is noteworthy that after the oil price
shock of the early seventies, many developing countries subsidized their
oil imports and only after some time allowed the domestic price of oil
to rise gradually.
(1) Classical Unemployment : In a classical unemployment situation
without a foreign exchange constraint, an increase in the foreign price
of imports would only increase the trade deficit, leaving everything
else the same. However, if the economy faces a foreign exchange con-
straint, such external shocks become quite effective, particularly when
the export capacity limit is also binding.
If the foreign exchange constraint is binding but exports are
voluntarily held below their demand limit, a change in the foreign
price of the intermediate good changes the "optimal" input and produc-
tion levels. It can be shown that if the second-order conditions of
the rationing rule holds, an increase in p* will reduce L"* and N* (see
section (2) of the Appendix). As one expects, the domestic use of the
final good falls exactly by the additional amount of foreign exchange
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that the country has to pay for its imports; that is, by imports times
the increase in p*. This result can be verified by differentiating
(16) and substituting from (20):
(35) dE = p*dN + (N - X )dp*,
fLN
d(X - E) = C-Ws— + f - p*)dN - (N - X )dp* = -(N - X )dp*.
1
LL
" l
As we saw in Section III, equations (18) and (20) imply that L*
S
and N* are independent of B and, therefore, an increase in the foreign
borrowing limit leads to an equal reduction in exports and increase in
the domestic use of the final good, leaving everything else the same.
S
If the export capacity limit is binding, any increase in B leads
to an increase in N and drives up the output of sector 1. Domestic use
of the final good increases by an amount larger than the increase in
foreign borrowing due to the high marginal productivity of intermediate
input. To show this, we can write:
c
dX, dN 1 dX, „
s
(36) d(X
x
- E ) - dX
x
= <_)(_)dB - ^(^-)dB > dB
,
dB
where we have used the fact that, in this case, dX /dN > p*. In this
situation, an increase in p* has the same effect as that of a reduction
S
in B by the amount of imports times the change in p*. Therefore,
(37) d(X
L
- E>C -
-^dN^O* - X2 )dp>
Note that equations (35)—(37) show that under a classical unemployment
regime, dX /(p*dN) may be used as a measure of foreign exchange
"shortage" to determine the extent to which domestic production is
vulnerable to external shocks. dX /(p*dN) = 1 implies marginal produc-
tivity of imports is equal to their international price and, therefore,
there is no real "shortage."
(2) Keynesian Unemployment : If import prices rise when the eco-
nomy is in Keynesian unemployment situation with no foreign exchange
constraint, it only increases the trade deficit. On the other hand, if
the foreign exchange constraint is binding, the same shock leads to an
increase in employment and production. This effect is similar to that
of an increase in p in the absence of a foreign exchange constraint:
when terms of trade deteriorates, imports have to be reduced; this
squeezes the supply of the intermediate input for sector 1 and induces
more employment. As a result, disposable income increases and begins
a multiplier process which leads to higher employment and higher output
A reduction in the borrowing limit has also the same effect.
These results are quite interesting since they show that import
price rise and foreign exchange supply reduction have positive impacts
when the economy apparently suffers from foreign exchange "shortage,"
i.e., precisely when one expects the opposite. In this situation,
excess demand for imports and "shortage" of foreign exchange are decep-
tive since intensifying the "shortage" would force a substitution
towards unemployed domestic resources and induce higher final demand
and higher output. Note that the measure of foreign exchange "shortage'
13
discussed above, i.e., dX /(p*dN), is negative in this case.
The results of this section have interesting implications for the
interpretation of the growth performance of developing countries
after the oil shock in 1973. In the mid-seventies, many oil-importing
developing countries suffered from loss of terms of trade in their
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foreign markets. Although the increased supply of capital in the world
markets alleviated the problem to some extent, rising debts could not
be sustained and most of these countries had to reduce the rate of
growth of their imports. The differential effects of these shocks in
different countries, of course, depended on the magnitude of shock that
each, country experienced. However, in light of the above analysis, one
also expects the effects to depend on the initial conditions of the
country as well as on the policies pursued later. If a country is in a
Keynesian unemployment situation, it may actually benefit from a loss
in its terms of trade. This might have been the case in India where
14
the GNP growth rate increased somewhat in the mid-seventies. On the
other hand, in a classical unemployment situation, the growth rate may
fall when import prices increase. As we have seen above, the magnitude
of the change in the rate of growth of output depends on the severity
of foreign exchange shortage. If imports are productive for the economy,
particularly if the country is pursuing second-stage import substitution
policies and protecting its intermediate good sectors, loss of purchasing
power in foreign markets would cause a great loss in terms of output.
This situation may apply to many Latin American countries where growth
rates diminished after the oil shock. However, export promoting coun-
tries such as Korea and Singapore, which had better foreign exchange
situations and more developed export markets as well as lower intermediate
good prices, suffered much less. These countries may be classified
under the classical unemployment regime with weak foreign exchange con-
straint and with no binding export limit.
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V . Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the role of the foreign exchange
market in non-Walrasian fixed-price open economy models. The two-sector
model developed in this paper shows that the non-Walrasian unemploy-
ment regimes may respond to internal and external shocks differently
depending on the situation in the foreign exchange market. The results
of experiments with changing domestic and foreign prices as well as
the foreign borrowing limit are summarized in Table 1. This table
shows that while wage policies have more or less similar effects in all
situations, import price policies have different impacts depending on
the nature of the unemployment regime and on the foreign exchange situa-
tion. The effects of an increase in foreign borrowing and of an import
price shock are also different in alternative regimes. Such differences
suggest that in "suboptimal" situations there is no unique adjustment
process and, therefore, macroeconomic policies should be designed with
an understanding of the nature of "disequilibrium" in all markets in the
economy. We have also seen that such differences may explain differen-
tial growth rates of oil-importing developing countries after the oil
crisis in the early seventies.
This paper has also taken a step towards the introduction of a more
relevant rationing scheme into the open economy fixed-price models.
We have argued that the simple rationing functions which are usually
assumed to prevail in the market for exportables can actually be desta-
bilizing when the economy faces a foreign exchange constraint. In this
paper, we have explored the implications of a rationing rule which
maximizes the domestic use of the final good by setting an "optimal"
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export level. This rule gives different priorities to the export com-
ponent of final demand in different situations. However, in most cases
it leads either to the full utilization of the export capacity or to
the rationing of exports alone.
Part of the results in this paper are, of course, due to the intro-
duction of an intermediate input into the model. This aspect as well
as the foreign exchange constraint make the model more relevant for the
study of macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms in developing countries.
However, the short-run analysis of this paper is certainly inadequate
for an understanding of the full consequences of foreign exchange shor-
tage, input and output rationing and other kinds of disequilibria in
these countries.
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Appendix
(1) The second-order condition of the domestic-use maximization
problem is
:
,2 ,2
d X d X
(A.l)
—^ = —t—i± < 0.
dE~ P*~ dN
where the differentiation is carried out assuming that w and p* are
constant. Substituting for dX /dN from (20), carrying out the second
differentiation, and rearranging, we find:
2
, . . _ r
f
LNN
f
LL
+ f
LLL
f
LN
/f
LL "
2f
LLN
f
LN. , ^LN^
, n(A. 2) S = -w[ = ] + f < 0.
( f
LL
)
2
Therefore, the second-order condition holds.
(2) The effects of changes in w and p* in a classical unemployment
situation with foreign exchange constraint and "optimal" exports can be
seen by differentiation of (18) and (20):
(A. 3) f
LL
dLl fLN
dN = d„,
(A.*) -»d(f
LN
/fu ) - (fLN/fLL)d» dfN - dp*.
Carrying out the differentiations in (A. 4) and solving for dL and dN,
we get:
(A. 5) SdL = -(fLN/fLL )dp* + (S
- R)dw,
(A. 6) SdN = dp* + Rdw,
where R - "(f^f^ - f^f
LN
)/(f
LL
)
3
- (A.3) and (A.6) show that par-
tial derivatives of L and N with respect to p* are both negative. The
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signs of their partial derivatives with respect to w cannot be deter-
mined a priori, since the signs of R and S-R are unknown.
(3) In order to analyze the impacts of domestic policies on our model
economy under a Keynesian unemployment regime with no binding foreign
exchange constraint, we begin with the differentiation of (1) and (23):
(A. 7) fdL + f dN = d2L ,LIN 1
(A. 8) -bdL, + b dN = f dw - f T dp
,
LIN N L
where b = wf - „ - pf . . > and b„ = pf kT - wf„„ > 0. Solving (A. 7) and
L LN LL N LN NN
(A. 8) for dL and dN yields:
(A. 9) DdL. = bdX. - (f ) dw + f
T
f„dp,
1 N 1 N L N
(A. 10) DdN = b dX - f
T
fMdw + (f )"dp,
where D = b f + b f > 0. Equations (A. 9) and (A. 10) show that eraploy-
L N N L
ment and intermediate input demand increase with X and their prices
have the expected signs.
In order to prove that output and the intermediate input demand in
sector 1 both fall when p goes down, we substitute for dX from (33)
into (A. 10) and rearrange to show that, in this situation, imports
should increase:
(A. 11) [D + b T pc/(l-c)](dN - dX_) = DdX. - ff dw + (f)~dp.L 2 2 L N L
Obviously, the first and third terms on the right-hand side of (A. 11)
will be positive when dp < 0. Therefore, dN - dX > 0, since its coef-
ficient in (A. 11) is positive. Finally, dX < due to (33).
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N'otes
"Cuddington (1981) and Steigum (1980) consider the effects of
import rationing. However, as we will see in this paper, the implica-
tions of import rationing are different from those of a "foreign
exchange constraint." In particular, the causes of import and export
rationing and their rules turn out to be quite different.
?
The possibility of credit rationing in international capital
markets due to asymmetric information and "sovereign risk" has been
studied by Sachs and Cohen (1982) and Kletzer (1982). Empirical evi-
dence on the prevalence of borrower rationing in international credit
markets for LDCs can be found in Eaton and Gersovitz (1980) and
Gersovitz (1982).
3
In the past, the importance of foreign exchange availability in
developing countries has been emphasized by the "two-gap" models.
However, these models have relatively rigid structures and, moreover,
suffer from the lack of a strong choice-theoretic foundation. Such
weaknesses render the "two-gap" models inappropriate for the analysis
of domestic policies. For examples of discussions of the "two gap"
models see Chenery and Bruno (1962), Chenery and Strout (1966), Bruton
(1969), and Findlay (1973).
4
For example, see Cuddington (1980).
Following Benassy (1975), we define the effective demand or supply
of an agent in a given market by the behavior of the agent in that
market when he takes into consideration the constraints he faces in all
other markets, but ignore any possible constraint he might face in the
market he is attending.
The existence of such a constraint on exports in the short run are
several. For example, the capacity for production of "exportables " may
be limited or infrastructure and marketing facilities may be under-
developed. In any case, the point of this simplifying assumption is to
capture the essence of the difficulties in expanding exports in the
short run.
It is important to bear in mind that in the real world, distinc-
tion between binding and relax foreign exchange constraint is not as
clear-cut as pictured here. However, one can distinguish between
"hard" and "soft" constraints in the sense defined by Kornai (1979).
If borrowing more than what the country has already borrowed is diffi-
cult and costly, the foreign exchange constraint is said to be "hard";
otherwise, it is "soft." Similar definitions apply to other demand and
supply constraints in the present model. The strict relationships
defined here are simplifications and are meant to render the model
manageable.
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The second order conditions will hold by virtue of the assumptions
made in (3).
9
For example, see Dixit (1978) and Cuddington (1980, 1981).
See Krueger (1978), p. 50, for details.
Note that the complementarity assumption between labor and inter-
mediate input in (3) is responsible for this result. This assumption
may not hold in the long run.
12
As mentioned above, in sector 1, labor and the intermediate input
are always net substitutes.
13
The result that foreign assistance may have negative marginal
productivity in an economy in a Keynesian unemployment situation, was
not noticed by the "two-gap" models because they did not allow for
demand constraints or substitution between domestic and foreign re-
sources. Thus, a foreign exchange constrained Keynesian unemployment
situation could not appear in those models.
14
These examples are merely suggestive and not based on any case
study. Therefore, they might not be truly applicable. In particular,
in case of India, increased remittances from the Gulf region and good
harvests due to favorable weather, rather than the foreign exchange
shortage, may have been the major causes of increased growth in the
mid-seventies. However, one also observes the fact that, unlike most
other countries, India had no inflation during the same years, suggest-
ing a lack of excess demand and possibly a Keynesian unemployment situa-
tion.
Growth performances of these and other developing countries after
the oil crisis have been studied by several authors. Most of these
studies analyze the policy responses after the oil shock and pay little
attention to the initial conditions of these countries. See, for
example, Balassa (1980).
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Table 1
Domestic Policy Variables
w
Classical Keynesian Classical Keynesian
Unemployment: Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment
Endogenous
Variable N B
l
B
2
+
N B
X
lyA
2
+
+ + + + +
L ? + + + -
1 -
^-
E ? + + +
1 +
N B, N 3
Foreign Exogenous Variables
Classical Keynesian Classical Keynesian
Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment
Endogenous
Variable
L
E
N B
1
B
2
N B N B
1
B
2
N
+ +
+ +
-
+ + +
-
B
B: Foreign exchange constraint binding
B.
:
Foreign exchange constraint binding; export limit not binding
B_: Foreign exchange constraint binding; export limit also binding
N: Foreign exchange constraint not binding




HECKMAN
BINDERY INC.
JUN95
I Bound
-To
-Plea*? N.MANCHESTER
INDIANA 46962 j

